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Representative democracy in America is up for sale.
Like farmers at a livestock auction, special interest groups
are clamoring to place their bids on the members of Con-
gress most likely to produce the best return on their invest-
ment. The present system of financing federal elections in
this country has effectively placed Congress on the auc-
tion block, resulting in a dangerous erosion of our democrat-
ic institutions.
The influence of special interest money in electoral
campaigns perverts the democratic process and seriously
undermines principles of political participation and equali-
ty that are at the heart of the American system of govern-
ment. The ability of organized interests to aggregate wealth
and political power through political action committees
(PACs) not only affects the outcome of elections and poli-
cy debates, but also vitiates legislative accountability.
Perhaps the most insidious threat to democracy posed by
the union of money and politics is the growing cynicism
and diminished political participation among individual
voters.!
Congressional efforts to curb the negative influence of
special interest money in American politics have been se-
verely impeded by the Supreme Court and have thus been
largely ineffective. The Court's landmark decision in Buck-
ley v. Valeo2 essentially granted constitutional protection
to the polluting role of concentrated wealth in elections.
Under the present campaign finance system, the no-
tion of "one person, one votd' has been rendered meaning-
less. An urgent need exists for broad reforms in campaign
spending laws, as well as a re-evaluation of the Supreme
Court's precedents in this area. This article examines the
history and judicial review of federal campaign finance laws,
analyzes the effect of uncontrolled campaign spending on
the democratic process, and offers proposals for reform.
Kathleen A. Welch is a J.D. Candidate, May 1991, State
University of New York at Buffalo, School of Law. Welch
has worked as a community organizer and lobbyist for
citizen groups in New York and Texas. Welch also served
for four years as the energy policy coordinator for a na-
tional consumer and environmental organization in
Washington, D.C.
History of Campaign Finance in America
Although campaign financing emerged as a major is-
sue in the 1832 presidential race between Andrew Jack-
son and Henry Clay,3 it was not until 1867 that Congress
enacted the first restrictions on campaign activity. The
Naval Appropriations Bill of 18674 prohibited government
employees from soliciting money for political purposes from
workers in the naval yards. Ongoing concern over the ef-
fects of the spoils system in federal employment led to
enactment of the Civil Service Reforms Act in 1883. This
law made it illegal for any federal employee to solicit cam-
paign funds from another federal employee.
The 'muckraking" era of the early twentieth century led
to passage of the Tillman Act 6 in 1907 which prohibited
a corporation or national bank from making contributions
from their treasuries to campaigns for federal office.7 Dur-
ing the next several years, requirements for campaign con-
tribution disclosures were enacted, as well as the first
expenditure limits for congressional candidates.
Congress revised the campaign finance system by
enacting the Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, which
remained the principal campaign finance law until the ear-
ly 1970's.8 The Act 'continued the existing prohibitions on
contributions by corporations and banks, and required the
reporting of campaign receipts and expenditures, but...was
infinitely evadable and was never really enforced."9
The discovery of massive campaign abuses during the
Watergate scandal,'0 and the skyrocketing costs of cam-
paigns, prompted a government reform movement that cul-
minated in the passage of sweeping campaigning finance
laws in the early 1970's." The Federal Election Campaign
Act (FECA), enacted in 1971 and amended in 1974, created
a comprehensive system of campaign finance restrictions.!
The Act contained six primary features:
(1) rigid spending limits for federal candidates;
(2) limits on the amounts any individual or com-
mittee could contribute to any candidate;
(3) public financing in presidential campaigns;
(4) requirements for disclosure and reporting of
campaign contributions and expenditures;
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(5) the creation of the Federal Election Commis-
sion (FEC) to enforce campaign laws and over-
see elections; and
(6) explicit approval for corporations and labor un-
ions to utilize their treasuries to solicit political
action committee (PAC) contributions and ad-
minister PACs.
The Act had a tremendous impact on the financing of
American politics. In particular was the dramatic growth
of PACs, entities which represent the economic, ideologi-
cal or other interests of people by pooling money and dis-
tributing it directly and indirectly to the campaigns of
individual candidates. Many PACs are affiliated with labor
unions or corporations, although there are a large number
affiliated with trade associations, membership organiza-
tions, ideological groups, and groups representing a par-
ticular cause such as the environment.
13
According to Philip Stem, director of Citizens Against
PACs, an organization that vigorously supports compre-
hensive campaign finance reform, "the 1974 law set off a
PAC explosion." 14 The Center for Responsive Politics, a na-
tional organization that conducts research on congressional
and political trends, reports that "the number of PACs grew
from 608 in 1974 to 4,828 by the end of 1988. Their total
contributions to congressional candidates skyrocketed from
$12.5 million in 1974 to more than $151 million in 1988." "
Judicial Review of Campaign Finance Laws
The campaign finance structure designed by Congress
in FECA was dismantled by the Supreme Court's 1976 de-
cision in Buckley v. Valeo.!6 The Buckley Court equated
campaign spending with speech and declared that the
FECA restrictions affected "an area of the most fundamen-
tal First Amendment activities " 7 Regulation of campaign
spending should, in the Court's view, be "subject to the
closest scrutiny,' 8 but a compelling government interest
could nonetheless justify burdens on free speech. The Court
"sought to balance the First Amendment rights of free
speech and free association against the power of Congress
to enact laws designed to protect the integrity of federal
elections " 9
Specifically, the Buckley decision struck down three
of FECAs spending restrictions: (1) the limitations on in-
dependent expenditures made by individuals or groups on
behalf of a candidate; (2) the limits on the amount of per-
sonal or family funds a candidate can spend on her/his own
campaign; and (3) the aggregate limit on campaign expen-
ditures.20 The Court upheld the restrictions on direct con-
tributions to candidates, 2' the disclosure requirements,
22
and the establishment of the Federal Election Commis-
sion.23 The system for public financing of presidential elec-
tions was also left intact,24 and the Court explicitly stated
that Congress could condition acceptance of those funds
with spending limits.
25
In declaring major provisions of FECA unconstitution-
al, the Supreme Court drew a highly questionable distinc-
tion between the effect of limits on direct contributions to
a candidate - which were held permissible - and restric-
tions on "independent" expenditures - which were reject-
ed. "Independent" expenditures included money given to and
spent by "independent" individuals or organizations, prin-
cipally PACs.2 6 In contrast to direct contributions to can-
didates, "independent" expenditures were in the eyes of the
Court, made without coordination with the candidate
In upholding the limitations on direct contributions, the
Buckley Court stated that such limits "entail[ed] only a mar-
ginal restriction upon the contributor's ability to engage in
free communication"" Moreover, the Court concluded that
Congress' interest in preventing "the actuality and appear-
ance of corruption resulting from large individual financial
contributions" was a "constitutionally sufficient justification
for contribution limitations. 28 Acknowledging the corrosive
influence of campaign contributions, the Court stated, "to
the extent that large contributions are given to secure a po-
litical quid pro quo from current and potential office holders,
the integrity of the system of representative democracy is
undermined "29 Although the Court recognized the difficulty
in proving the scope of such "pemicious practices,"30 it con-
cluded that the problem was "not an illusory one
3
l
The Court further emphasized the danger of "the ap-
pearance of corruption stemming from public awareness
of the opportunities for abuse 3 2 in a system allowing large
financial contributions. According to the Buckley Court, it
would be legitimate for Congress to conclude that "the
avoidance of the appearance of improper influence 'is also
critical if the confidence in the system of representative
government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent' "
33
Expenditure limitations, according to the Court,
"represent[ed] substantial rather than merely theoretical res-
traints on the quantity and diversity of political speech" and
thus violated the First Amendment.34 The Court, in appar-
ent contradiction, found that the ceiling on independent ex-
penditures failed to "serve any substantial governmental
interest in stemming the reality or appearance of corrup-
tion in the electoral process' 3 and therefore did not justi-
fy an infringement of the First Amendment.
The Buckley Court based its conclusion in part on the
lack of empirical evidence of the effect of independent ex-
penditures. The Court stated, "independent advocacy res-
tricted by the provision does not presently appear to pose
dangers of real or apparent corruption compared to those
identified with large campaign contributions "36
The Buckley v. Valeo decision has been met with con-
siderable criticism by many commentators and advocates
of campaign finance reform.3 7 U.S. Court of Appeals Judge
J. Skelly Wright, who decided Buckley in the lower court
and was a vociferous advocate of campaign spending limits,
described the Supreme Court's decision as "tragically mis-
guided."38 Indeed, the Court's rationale for the direct
contribution-independent expenditure distinction is ex-
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tremely weak and does not appear to be grounded in the
reality of contemporary American politics. Nevertheless, the
Buckley decision continues to be the leading judicial prece-
dent governing campaign finance restrictions.
Subsequent Supreme Court reviews of campaign
finance laws have reinforced the First Amendment protec-
tions granted in Buckley. 9 The collective jurisprudence in
this area suggests, however, that if it could be shown that
campaign expenditures, like contributions, pose a serious
threat of actual or potential corruption, the Supreme Court
might reconsider the Buckley doctrine.4"
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,4" decided
two years after Buckley v. Valeo, the Court struck down
a Massachusetts ordinance limiting corporate expenditures
on ballot initiatives. Significantly, the Court stated that if
it could be shown that corporate advocacy 'threatened im-
minently to undermine the democratic process...these ar-
guments would merit our consideration'4 2 In a 1986 case,
FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,43 the Supreme
Court again recognized the potential for corruption arising
out of corporate advocacy:
This concern over the corrosive influence of
concentrated corporate wealth reflects the con-
viction that it is important to protect the integri-
ty of the marketplace of ideas...Direct corporate
spending on political activity raises the prospect
that resources amassed in the economic mar-
ketplace may be used to provide an unfair ad-
vantage in the political marketplace.
44
In Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL), the Court
found unconstitutional the requirement in FECA Section
316 that ideological nonprofit corporations create PACs in
order to make independent campaign expenditures. Accord-
ing to the Court, such groups are formed to disseminate
political ideals, not to amass capital, and thus do not pose
the danger of corruption that justifies regulation of expen-
ditures from their treasuries.41 In lengthy dicta, however, the
five member majority explained why such a restriction on
business corporations would be constitutional. According
to one commentator, the Court's opinion, "says as much
about why the political expression of business corporations
may be regulated as it says about why the expression of
MCFL was not .4 The dicta in MCFL suggests additional
regulation of corporate PACs - including limits on expen-
ditures - might be upheld if it could be demonstrated that
corporate PAC expenditures resulted in corruption through
the "unfair deployment of wealth for political purposes."4
However, in Federal Election Commission v. National
Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC),48 the
Court made it clear that demonstrating the corrupting ef-
fect of independent expenditures would be extremely
difficult. The Court declared unconstitutional a $1,000 limit
on expenditures by PACs for the benefit of presidential can-
didates who voluntarily accepted public financing. The
Supreme Court based its decision on the lack of compel-
ling government interest since there was "no potential for
corruption 49 related to the PAC expenditures. According
to the majority in the NCPAC decision:
The fact that candidates and elected officials
may alter or reaffirm their own positions on is-
sues in response to political messages paid for
by the PACs can hardly be called corruption,
for one of the essential features of democracy
is the presentation to the electorate of varying
points of view.
50
As in Buckley, the NCPAC Court further found that
because the expenditures were made "independently' rather
than by the candidate, there was no danger of corruption
sufficient to justify the limitation. In the Courts view, the
"absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expen-
diture with the candidate or his agent not only undermines
the value of the expenditure to the candidate, but also al-
leviates the danger that expenditures will be given a quid
pro quo for improper commitments from the candidate."'
This decision was reached in spite of extensive evidence
presented by the FEC which demonstrated the corrupting
influence of PAC expenditures.5 2
Reconsidering the Buckley v. Valeo doctrine
Future efforts by Congress to reform campaign
finance laws will continue to be significantly constrained
by the Supreme Courts decisions in Buckley and more re-
cent campaign finance cases. Nonetheless, at least two
limited opportunities for judicial reconsideration emerge.
First, a case could be made to demonstrate, based on new
and more extensive evidence, the actuality and appearance
of corruption that arises from the present campaign finance
system. Second, other compelling government interests
might convince a majority of the Court to allow greater res-
trictions on financing.
53
A. The corrupting effect of the present camp-
aign finance system on the democratic process.
Democracy in America is perceived as a system of
representative government, where individual citizens choose
leaders to represent their interests by exercising their right
to vote. Participation in politics, beyond the vote, is widely
valued as important to the proper functioning of democratic
government.
At the root of American democracy is the ideal of po-
litical equality. In the Federalist Papers, James Madison
described the nature of political equality in what would be-
come this country's system of government.
Who are to be the electors of the Federal Rep-
resentatives? Not the rich more than the poor;
not the learned, more than the ignorant; not
the haughty heirs of distinguished names, more
-I
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than the humble sons of obscurity and unpro-
pitious fortune. The electors are to be the great
body of the people of the United States.
5 4
As Chief Justice Warren wrote in Reynolds v. Sims,
5 5
"Representative government is in essence self-government
through the medium of elected representatives of the peo-
ple, and each and every citizen has an inalienable right to
full and effective participation in the political processes of
his State's legislative bodies. 6
The unfortunate reality is that the dramatic rise in the
price of campaigns and the influence of special interest
money in politics have severely distorted the political
process and destroyed notions of political equality suppos-
edly inherent in American democracy. Rather than
representing the constituents who voted for them, mem-
bers of Congress seem to be in the business of raising
money, assuring reelection, and representing the concerns
of the special interests who line their campaign coffers. Un-
controlled campaign spending - the legacy of Buckley -
has created a system dependent upon PAC money that
favors incumbents and candidates with personal wealth.
The voices of individual citizens have been seriously dilut-
ed by the influence of those with organized economic pow-
er.
5 7
Campaign spending has risen enormously since the
1970s, particularly among candidates for the Senate and
House of Representatives. In the 1988 election cycle, con-
gressional candidates spent a total of $457.7 million, up
from $115.5 million in 1976.8 The costs of electoral cam-
paigns has diminished the responsiveness of members of
Congress to the individual voter. Many members have been
forced to become professional fundraisers first and
democratic representatives second. In 1988, the average
cost of winning a campaign for a seat in the House of
Representatives was $399,000, and just over $4 million for
the Senate.5 9 This means that each member of the House
would have to raise nearly $17,000 per month during a two-
year term, and Senators would be required to raise almost
$56,000 per month during their six-year term. One former
Congressman estimated that Senate candidates spend
roughly 80-90 percent of their time raising money, rather
than truly discussing the issues with voters. 60 These fun-
draising demands have made it extremely difficult for mem-
bers of Congress to be truly responsive to the individual
voting constituent.
There is a direct correlation between the amount of
money spent in an election and the result. For example, in
more than half of the races for the U.S. House of Represen-
tatives in 1988, the winner outspent the loser by a factor
of ten to one or greater.61 The rising costs of elections and
the inherent advantages of incumbency have led to what
one watchdog group calls 'the permanent Congress. 62 More
than 98 percent of incumbents in the House of Represen-
tatives won reelection in both 1986 and 1988.63 Incumbents
in congressional races have a seemingly insurmountable ad-
vantage over challengers, in large part because of their abil-
ity to raise special interest money and to "stockpild'
campaign funds.
As of January 1989, House members of the newly
elected 101st Congress had amassed more than $67 mil-
lion - an average of $154,000 each - in their campaign
warchests for future elections. 64 According to Public
Citizen's Congress Watch:
Large campaign "warchests" ... often discourage
otherwise likely and qualified challengers from
running .... Because the American public is
offered few options among candidates, it can
expect limited debate on the issues as well as
diminished accountability. As a result, incum-
bents are reelected at unprecedented rates,
creating a 'permanenf Congress - one which
often fails to represent the prevailing views of
the American public.
65
Competition in the political marketplace is at an all time
low. In a report on campaign spending in the 1988 elec-
tions, the Center for Responsive Politics pointed to a range
of reasons for this situation:
Considering a variety of factors - the record
low number of new members elected, the gap
in spending between winners and losers, the
vast disparity in fund raising between incum-
bents and challengers, and the highest incum-
bent reelection rate since 1792 - the
congressional elections of 1988 may well have
been the least competitive in the history of the
United States.
66
Further tainting the electoral process is the fact that
the source of much of these campaign funds are the spe-
cial interest PACs, who seem to have an unlimited capaci-
ty to raise money.67 In the first six months of 1987, the
leading corporate, labor, trade association, and professional
PACs (i.e. those that solicited over $100,000 in contribu-
tions) raised nearly $30 million, more than double the
amount raised over the same period in 1983.68
There is little doubt that the aim of the PACs is to buy
access and influence votes. According to Archibald Cox,
Chairman of the citizen watchdog group Common Cause
and one of the lead attorneys in the Buckley case, "it is
universally agreed that money buys access to legislators
and executive officials."69 Efforts by the PACs to control
the democratic process through elections and policy de-
bates are well-documented and accepted in political cir-
cles.7" Larry Sabato, a political scientist who has written
extensively on PACs, asserts, "Members of Congress have
themselves frequently offered the harshest interpretations
of the effect of PAC money on their voting proclivities"7
SPRING 1990
Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole of Kansas has ob-
served, 'When these PACs give they expect something in
return other than good government:72 Representative Tom
Downey of New York put it even more bluntly, 'You can't
buy a congressman for $5,000. But you can buy his vote.
It's done on a regular basis:73
Even PAC representatives themselves admit that their
goal is to further their own group's special interests. The
director of the American Trucking Association made this
clear when he stated, "We'll buy a ticket to anyones fun-
draising event, as long as he [sic] didn't vote the wrong way
on trucking issues."
4
Looking at PAC giving patterns, their influence-buying
motives are readily apparent. PACs have a remarkable pat-
tern of favoritism toward incumbents.75 In 1988, PACs gave
approximately 74 percent of their contributions to incum-
bents. PACs attempt to ensure access by giving to both
candidates in a contest, contributing to candidates whose
philosophy they don't necessarily share and, after elections,
giving to a winning candidate they had previously attempted
to defeat." It is difficult to imagine any other motive for
PAC giving than what amounts to legalized bribe. It cer-
tainly seems improbable that PACs would have expended
such large sums of money if they didnt think it would pur-
chase something.
Although it is not easy to empirically document a quid
pro quo connection between PAC contributions and expen-
ditures and legislative outcomes, there are innumerable ex-
amples that suggest a strong correlation.
Studies of issue after issue demonstrate that a
much higher percentage of legislators who vot-
ed with a PAC's position received money from
that PAC in the previous campaign than those
who voted the other way, and among the
beneficiaries of PAC money, those supporting
the PAC position had received a substantially
higher average contribution.77
PACs tend to concentrate their giving on members of
Committees with jurisdiction and control over their interest.
For example, a 1987 study by Common Cause revealed
that the top ten defense industry contractors concentrat-
ed 41 percent of their 1986 contributions and three-quarters
of their 1985 honoraria on the 18 percent of lawmakers
who make up the defense-related committees of Con-
gress.' On the average, PACs contribute 20 percent more-
to the Chairs of House Committees than other represen-
tatives.79
The tactics of PACs are not necessarily subtle or hid-
den in the record books of the Federal Election Commis-
sion. In 1981, the National Conservative Political Action
Committee (NCPAC), sent the following message to a
member of Congress:
If you will make a public statement in support
of the President's tax cut package and state that
you intend to vote for it, we will withdraw all
[independent, hostile] radio and newspaper ads
planned in your district. In addition, we will be
glad to run radio and newspaper ads applaud-
ing you for your vote to lower taxes.80
Such evidence suggests that prearrangement and col-
laboration between PACs and official candidate campaigns
is common. "In actual practice, the activities of candidate-
oriented PACs are coordinated and integrated with the offi-
cial campaign effort'8 Proof that coordination between "in-
dependent" spenders and campaigns certainly weakens the
Buckley Court's rationale that "independent" expenditures
do not threaten to corrupt the political system. Furthermore,
in todaVs sophisticated media oriented campaign process,
direct coordination is no longer necessary for "independent"
expenditures to directly influence campaign outcomes and
for candidates to recognize a PACs efforts on her behalf.82
The effect of PAC influence-peddling on legislative and
electoral outcomes raises serious questions about just who
Congress represents. One result of this distortion of
representative government is often that when special in-
terest groups prevail, huge costs are shouldered by the rest
of the citizens. For example, in the late 1980's, the finan-
cial lobbying tactics of one special interest left the Ameri-
can taxpayer holding an enormous bill. During what has be-
come known as the savings and loan (S&L) scandal, an own-
er of a failed S&L and his associates directed $1.3 million to
the campaigns and political causes of five U.S. Senators.
These Senators intervened on behalf of the failing S&L to
discourage banking regulators from taking action. The Se-
nators later became the subject of ethics investigations. As
a consequence, taxpayers will be forced to pay more than
$2 billion to bail out the bank.
83
Legislators who have been the beneficiaries of spend-
ing by outside special interest PACs (collections of individu-
als who cannot vote for them) may become less
accountable to their true constituents:
The PACs and their lobbyists are often able to
push their way in through the turnstiles ahead
of a lawmaker's own constituents, even though
they do not live, vote, or pay taxes in the law-
makers state or district. To the extent that this
is so, the influence of local voters is diluted.84
According to Representative Leon Panetta of Califor-
nia, "It's now tough to hear the voices of the citizens in your
district. Sometimes the only things you can hear are the
loud voices of the three-piece suits carrying a PAC check.85
Defenders of PACs suggest that the evolution of PACs
is simply a manifestation of pluralism. Herbert Alexander,
an expert in the field of campaign finance points out that,
PAC proponents stress that contributions are made by em-
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ployees, of their own free will, and that their aggregate po-
litical voice, meeting with other such voices in the political
arena, form something close to the textbook ideal of
pluralist democracy: 86 It has also been argued that "PACs
provide an effective voice for people who would not other-
wise be heard 8 7 Those who advocate 'PAC democracy"
also point out that PACs have "mobilized a substantial num-
ber of Americans to participate in politics, 88 thus enhanc-
ing participatory democracy.
These claims of "PAC democracy" are ill-founded. PAC
participation in politics falls far short of the pluralistic ideal
of political equality through competing interest groups, be-
cause many segments and interests of the electorate are
not represented. As Senator Robert Dole has said, "There
aren't any Poor PACs or Food Stamp PACs or Nutrition
PACs or Medicare PACs: 89
Furthermore, political participation in PACs hardly
reflects the traditional notion of participatory democracy:
PACs tend to be bureaucratically organized and
centralized, often at the national level. The voice
of the PAC is not that of its small givers whose
participation is extolled by PAC pluralists, but
of its leadership who decide where to bestow
the money.90
This point has been further emphasized by David
Adamany, a legal scholar and political scientist who has
written extensively on campaign finance: 'The real or ef-
fective financial constituency in these circumstances is the
PAC and its leadership, not the small givers to the PAC
campaign warchests. The candidate knows the programs
and objectives of the PAC officers that [sic] preferred ac-
cess is given.""
The ability of PACs to aggregate wealth and magnify
their political influence without regard to the size of their
membership, results in a form of 'multiple voting. 92 Multi-
ple voting is an effort to expand "influence beyond the sin-
gle ballot to which all citizens are legally entitled."9 3 It is
precisely this undue influence that poses such a grave threat
to political equality and American democracy. According
to Adamany, "money's extreme potential for multiple vot-
ing points to an important issue of political finance policy
in democracy: preventing gross inequalities in the meaning
of the vote"
94
Contrary to the Supreme Court's conclusion in Buck-
ley and its progeny,95 it is widely held in the academic and
political worlds alike that "money is a corrupting influence
and that PAC money, being the most concentrated and the
most blatant, is the most dangerous of all."96 The accumu-
lation of evidence demonstrating the actuality of corrup-
tion stemming from PAC contributions and expenditures
since the Buckley decision merits reconsideration by the
Court.
Additionally, the documented effects of the present sys-
tem on public confidence in government illustrate that the
appearance of corruption, an interest the Supreme Court
declared significant enough to allow First Amendment in-
fringement, has not been avoided.97 Statements made fre-
quently by members of Congress indicate that elected
officials themselves believe the present system creates both
the appearance and actuality of corruption.9 8 The most con-
vincing evidence of the public's concern for the corrupt na-
ture of campaign financing can be found in survey research.
In an independent poll sponsored by national citizen groups
in March 1990, 30 percent of voters polled said that their
own member of Congress is "caught up and corrupted by
the system of money and politics" and another 27 percent
stated that they did not know.99 Previous survey research
has also reflected the public's concern for the influence of
special interest money.00
B. Other compelling government interests
The Buckley decision indicated that further regulation
of campaign spending could be upheld if other significant
government interests were demonstrated. °I In the years fol-
lowing Buckley, at least two critical government interests
have become apparent: the preservation of representative
democracy and the restoration of the electoral process as
the primary means by which individual citizens participate
equally in politics. Although the Supreme Court failed in
Buckley and subsequent cases to identify these interests
as compelling, current evidence indicates that they may be
significant enough to support additional campaign finance
restrictions.
The escalating cost of campaigns and candidates' in-
creasing dependence on special interest funds have distort-
ed representative democracy. An even greater threat to the
future of American democracy is the growing cynicism and
apathy of the American voter toward the electoral process.
Former Senator Charles McC. Mathias, a Republican from
Maryland, pointedly raised the issue of public confidence
when he stated:
Almost as bad as the potential for inequity and
corruption in the current system of campaign
finance is the general perception of undue in-
fluence The latest Harris poll shows that 84
percent of americans...believe that 'those who
contribute large sums of money have too much
influence over the government! Now, I have no
doubt that this cynicism contributes to our ter-
rible state of voter apathy, apathy to the extent
that over half of the eligible voters do not bother
to turn out for congressional elections'
0 2
According to Archibald Cox, 'The close correlation be-
tween PAC contributions and legislation breeds cynicism
and then alienation from the political process"' 0 3 Existing
statistical evidence exists which indicates that increasing
apathy and alienation of the general public has resulted in
a dramatic decline in voter turnout 0 4 In testimony on cam-
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paign financing before a Senate Judiciary Subcommittee,
Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA) stated:
With each drop in public confidence or each in-
crease in public cynicism we run the risk of ir-
reparably damaging our democratic system. It
is no coincidence that voter participation, which
has steadily declined during the second centu-
ry of our democracy had done so during a time
of rising campaign costs and public lack of con-
fidence...So dire is the situation that more peo-
ple watched the Superbowl this year than voted
in the 1988 Presidential elections.!
0 5
Elizabeth Drew, a noted author and political journalist,
effectively summed up the real costs of the current system
of campaign finance in her book, Money and Politics:
We are paying in the declining quality of politi-
cians and of the legislative product and in the
rising public cynicism. We have allowed it to be-
come increasingly difficult for good people who
remain in politics to function well. What results
is a corrosion of the system and a new kind of
squalor.....As the public cynicism gets deeper,
the political system gets worse Until the
problem is dealt with, the system will not get
better. We have allowed the basic idea of our
democratic process - representative govem-
ment - to slip away.
0 6
As Dean Rosenthal of Columbia University described
the interest in restoring the electoral process:
The goal of enriching the electoral system,
through broadening the base of citizen influence
and reducing inequities in the opportunities of
candidates and their supporters to persuade the
electorate, is a worthy one; it is not only con-
sistent with but indispensable to the attainment
of one of the most fundamental purposes of the
Constitution.0 7
The Buckley doctrine that prohibits limitations on "in-
dependent" expenditures should be overruled and further
campaign finance restrictions should be allowed. Based
upon the convincing evidence that actual and perceived cor-
ruption have not been avoided, the Supreme Court should
also acknowledge other compelling government interests
that justify more stringent regulations of campaign
financing.
Reforming the Campaign Finance System
The aim of efforts to restructure our present system
of financing election campaigns should be to lessen the in-
fluence of "interested money that is, money spent with the
expectation of some type of direct or indirect return.
Another important goal should be to reduce the costs of
campaigns. Candidates and elected officials need to be
freed from the constant demands to raise exhorbitant sums
of money. Elected officials should be responsible to the con-
stituents who vote for them, not those special interests who
finance their campaigns. The campaign finance system
should encourage political competition, allowing candidates
without personal wealth a fair opportunity to run for office
Finally, campaign finance reforms should encourage open
public debate on the issues, and individual citizen partici-
pation in the democratic process.
Any attempts by Congress to reform the campaign
finance system will be subject to the restrictive constitu-
tional guidelines laid down by the Supreme Court in Buck-
ley and its progeny. Mounting evidence of the corrupting
influence of money on politics and the emergence of addi-
tional compelling government interests could move a majori-
ty of the Court to allow limitations on "independent"
expenditures and further limitations on direct contributions.
Such limitations are essential to effectively loosen the stran-
glehold special interests appear to have on members of
Congress and the democratic process.
Any legislative reforms of the campaign finance sys-
tem will undoubtedly be met with political as well as con-
stitutional obstacles. While many members of Congress
decry the high costs of elections and influence-peddling of
the PACs,""8 many continue to be resistant to changing the
system that elected them. Nevertheless, the political climate
in Washington seems to be ripe for change. The recent sav-
ings and loan scandal and the extensive ethics investiga-
tions of members of Congress over the past few years, have
underscored the urgent need for an overhaul of the cam-
paign finance system.'0 9 President Bush is the first Repub-
lican President since Teddy Roosevelt to declare campaign
finance reform a priority issue, and both the Senate Majority
Leader and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
have pledged to bring this matter to a vote."0
The demand for broad campaign finance reforms is
widespread. A coalition of 56 national organizations was
formed in February 1990 to advocate for comprehensive
changes in the present system." Surveys also indicate
strong and rising support for campaign finance reforms
among the American electorate. In a poll released in March
1990, 58 percent of American voters stated that they would
support public financing for candidates for Congress and
a ban on private contributions; only 33 percent expressed
opposition. The poll also found that 77 percent of those
surveyed supported an overall spending cap on congres-
sional campaigns, and 71 percent favored severe restric-
tions on contributions by PACs.! 2 Finally, many academic
and legal commentators have pointed to the need for a new
system for financing elections in order to prevent political
money from distorting legislative decisionmaking '
3
A comprehensive package of legislative reforms -
designed to abide by the Supreme Courts doctrine on cam-
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paign finance - should include four major components:
1) public financing and overall spending caps in congres-
sional elections; 2) measures to reduce the costs of cam-
paigns; 3) limits on PAC contributions; and 4) measures
to close certain loopholes in existing campaign finance laws.
Additionally, Congress should strengthen the enforcement
powers and independence of the Federal Election Commis-
sion, the agency in charge of overseeing the implementa-
tion of campaign finance regulations!' 4
1) Public financing of
congressional campaigns
A system of public financing for congressional races,
like the system now in place for presidential elections, would
reduce the influence of PACs in House and Senate elec-
tions." 5 It could also help to restore real competition in the
political marketplace In general, a public financing system
would allow a candidate to receive public funds once she
raised a threshold amount of small private contributions
and agreed to adhere to voluntary spending limits. Accord-
ing to Fred Wertheimer, President of Common Cause, the
advantages of public financing are:
(1) Candidates would be less dependent on spe-
cial interest groups' contributions because they
would have an alternative way to finance their
races.
(2) Incumbents would have less of a financial ad-
vantage than they now have. Challengers would
be able to have small contributions collected
from supporters matched by public funds. The
amount of funds available to challengers should
increase substantially.
(3) It would be to a candidate's advantage to try
to get as many small individual contributions
as possible, because each of these small con-
tributions would be matched by public funds!'
16
Public Citizen has argued that, "the effort to drive spe-
cial interest money out of the system will only succeed if
it is replaced by untainted funds" and that public financing
is the best mechanism to achieve that goal.' 7 Public Citizen
also argues that public financing will benefit incumbents
and challengers alike" 8
Public financing of congressional races has received wide
support?' 9 In the words of Judge J. Skelly Wright, "with
one stroke public financing could do much to remove the
poison of money from the political bloodstream - even
within the confines of the narrow constitutional limitations
the present Supreme Court imposes on us.1
2 °
2) Measures to reduce costs of campaigns
In order to dilute the influence of special interest money
on elections, it is necessary to lessen the need for politi-
clans to raise enormous sums for their campaigns. Public
financing coupled with voluntary spending limits is one way
to do this." Congress should also enact measures which
would help to bring down the costs of campaigns, particu-
larly media costs. Campaigns have become increasingly de-
pendent upon costly television advertising, which has
become the primary source of the rising cost of campaign-
ing! 2 2 In the past, Congress has required television stations
to provide air time to candidates at reduced rates prior to
primary and general elections. 23 It has also been proposed
that Congress require broadcasters to allow for a specified
amount of free air time for candidates.!24 Free air time could
be utilized as a forum for substantive public debate of the
issues facing voters. Congress could also lower postal rates
for congressional campaigns, thus allowing candidates to
communicate directly with individual voters at reduced
costs. Although incremental in nature, such cost reduction
measures could do much to mitigate the burden of rising
campaign costs.
3) Limits on PAC contributions
Further limiting the amount that PACs can directly con-
tribute to candidates would help to diminish their undue
influence. Under the FECA, PACs may now contribute up
to $5,000 to each candidate; individuals may contribute
up to $1,000. There is no limit on the overall amount a can-
didate can receive from all PACs. 25 Proponents of limits
on PAC contributions believe more restrictive limits need
to be placed on both individual PAC contributions and the
aggregate amount of PAC money a member of Congress
can receive. 26 In support of the aggregate contribution limit,
David Adamany has stated, "this kind of aggregate contri-
bution limit addresses the danger of a coalition contribut-
ing in which many corporations, trade associations and
unions with similar interests dominate the financial consti-
tuency of members of Congress who hold key leadership
or committee seats:
1 27
4) Measures to close loopholes
in existing law
Under FECA, a loophole currently exists that allows
unlimited contributions from corporations, unions, and
wealthy individuals to political parties, as long as they are
directed into "soft money" accounts. "Soft money" consists
of funds used for such activities as voter registration, get-
out-the-vote campaigns and other party building efforts. Ac-
cording to Public Citizen, "soft money presents two major
problems:
First, since many of the "soft money" activities
are designed to influence federal elections, it
represents a flagrant evasion of spending limits.
Second, it is a vehicle for corporations, unions
and wealthy individuals to give 'tremendous
sums of money (sometimes exceeding




Public Citizen has proposed that "soft money contributions
intended to affect federal elections should be subject to the
same limits placed on contributions made directly to fed-
eral candidates.
" 29
Achieving a political consensus on comprehensive
campaign finance reforms within the Congress will no doubt
prove extremely difficult. Since the Buckley decision, many
unsuccessful attempts at reform have been made
30
However, in light of growing public support for changes,
and recent political scandals, the prospects for reform may
be better than ever. In the 101st Congress, more than 30
pieces of legislation dealing with some aspect of campaign
finance reform were introduced. These legislative proposals
addressed a wide range of campaign finance reforms; some
of the bills included many of the elements necessary for
comprehensive reform? 31 In March 1990, a bipartisan panel
of experts appointed by Congress released a compromise
package of proposals that some politicians believed could
be a catalyst for a final legislative consensus on this issue.
32
Although the compromise package may break a political
logjam, it has been widely criticized as too weak to resolve
our present crisis in the financing of elections.
33
Unfortunately, the nature of the political process sug-
gests that whatever reforms Congress enacts will likely be
incremental in nature. If Congress expects to restore pub-
lic confidence in the political process, however, it should
move expeditiously to enact a bold and comprehensive
package of campaign finance reforms.
Conclusion
The political experiences in the intervening years since
the Supreme Court first established the doctrine govern-
ing campaign finance in Buckley v. Valeo have brought us
to a point of urgency. Judge J. Skelly Wright eloquently
described our present crisis in democracy more than seven
years ago
When money becomes more important than
people, when media mastery weighs more heav-
ily than appeals to judgment, when opportuni-
ties to communicate with voters are extremely
unequal, the result is a cynical distortion of the
electoral process. The peoples choices are not
based on their informed preferences among
ideas and candidates and government of the
people, by the people, and for the people be-
comes an empty shibboleth.'34
Democratic institutions in America are more accurately
characterized as government of the PACs, by the PACs,
and for the PACs. Restoring representative democracy and
enhancing political participation and equality requires that
the influence of special interest money in politics be sig-
nificantly diluted, if not eliminated. It is time for Congress
to muster up the political will to enact strong new cam-
paign finance reforms. Moreover, it is time for the Supreme
Court to abandon the misguided doctrine of Buckley v.
Valeo.
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